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Abstract
We consider dynamic congestion in an urban setting where trip origins
are spatially distributed. All travelers must pass through a downtown bottle-
neck in order to reach their destination in the CBD. Each traveler chooses
departure time to maximize general concave scheduling utility. We find that,
at equilibrium, travelers sort according to their distance to the destination;
the queue is always unimodal regardless of the spatial distribution of trip
origins. We construct a welfare maximizing tolling regime, which elimi-
nates congestion. All travelers located beyond a critical distance from the
CBD gain from tolling, even when toll revenues are not redistributed, while
nearby travelers lose. We discuss our results in the context of acceptability
of tolling policies.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a model that integrates two prominent features of urban con-
gestion, focusing on the exemplary case of the morning commute. The first feature
is that congestion is a dynamic phenomenon in the sense that congestion at one
time of day affects conditions later in the day through the persistence of queues.
The second feature is that trip origins are spatially distributed. We analyze how
these features interact in a city with a central bottleneck and provide results con-
cerning optimal pricing.
The dynamics of congestion were analyzed in the seminal Vickrey (1969) bot-
tleneck model (see also Arnott et al., 1993), which captures the essence of con-
gestion dynamics in a simple and tractable way. Travellers are viewed as having
scheduling preferences concerning the timing of trips that have to pass the bot-
tleneck. The analysis concerns equilibrium in the traveller choice of departure
time.
The Vickrey (1969) analysis of congestion, however, essentially ignores space.
Using the notation of the current paper, travellers are depicted as travelling some
distance c (measured in time units) until they reach a bottleneck at time a. They
exit the bottleneck to arrive at the destination at time t. They have scheduling pref-
erences, always preferring to depart later and always preferring to arrive earlier.
The Vickrey (1969) scheduling preferences can be expressed by the scheduling
cost α · c+α · (t− a)+D (t) , where α is the value of travel time, t−a is the time
spent in the bottleneck and D (t) = β · max (0, t∗ − t) + γ · max (0, t− t∗) is a
convex function capturing the cost of being early or late relative to some preferred
arrival time t∗. The Vickrey formulation of scheduling preferences is additively
separable in trip duration and arrival time and it is linear in trip duration. So it is
clear that the distance c to the bottleneck does not matter for the Vickrey analysis
of how travellers time their arrival at the bottleneck and the ensuing congestion.1
It is not generally true that the distance from trip origins to the destination
is irrelevant for the timing of trips. Consider a traveller who always prefers to
depart later and always prefers to arrive earlier. Faced by a fixed trip duration that
is independent of the departure time, such a traveller will optimally time his trip
such that his marginal utility of being at the origin at the departure time equals
his marginal utility of being at the destination at the arrival time. If the marginal
utility at the origin is decreasing and his marginal utility of being at the destination
is increasing, then an increase in trip duration will cause him to depart earlier and
1The analysis of the bottleneck model has been developed and extended in various directions
by Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey in a series of papers; notably Arnott et al. (1993). These authors
use the above α − β − γ preferences or a version where the function D (t) has a more general
form. They always maintain linearity and additive separability of travel time and are hence unable
to analyse the consequences of distance for congestion.
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to arrive later. In this way the distance can matter for the timing of trips. This
paper concerns travellers with such scheduling preferences.
Congestion can arise when there is a bottleneck and many individuals who
want to pass the bottleneck at the same time. It is not a sufficient condition for
congestion to arise that travellers have similar scheduling preferences. Trip origins
must also be located with similar distances to the bottleneck. If trip origins are
sufficiently dispersed, then congestion does not arise as there is no overlap in the
times when travellers want to pass the bottleneck. Hence it is clear that the spatial
distribution of travel demand is a fundamental determinant of urban congestion.
This observation stands in contrast to the standard urban model, where congestion
increases with population dispersion.
This paper is the first to allow for spatial heterogeneity in the bottleneck model
in a meaningful way. In our model, heterogeneity is induced by the structure of the
city. A number of earlier contributions have considered preference heterogeneity
in the context of the bottleneck model (e.g., Vickrey, 1973; Arnott et al., 1994;
van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011). These papers work in the context of linear sep-
arable Vickrey (1969) scheduling preferences and heterogeneity is introduced by
varying α− β− γ, while maintaining the ratio β/γ fixed for reasons of analytical
convenience. Generally speaking, this sort of heterogeneity can induce travellers
to sort according to the degree of closeness to the center of the congestion peak;
in a two group case, sorting has the form that one group occupies a central time
interval while the other group occupies the early and late shoulders. In contrast,
this paper finds that travelers sort according to their distance to the bottleneck; this
occurs both under no tolling and under optimal tolling, and the result is derived
under quite general assumptions concerning scheduling preferences.2 Hendrick-
son and Kocur (1981), Smith (1984), Newell (1987), and Arnott et al. (1994)
consider the case of travellers with scheduling preferences, such as α−β−γ, that
are additively separable in trip duration and arrival time and who differ in their
preferred arrival time. In that case, travellers sort according to their preferred ar-
rival time, which is similar to what we obtain here. Kuwahara (1990) extends this
to a geometry consisting of two residential areas and a CBD with bottlenecks in
between. Travellers within each group then still sort according to their preferred
arrival time, but a strict sequence does not hold for the two groups together. The
present case is more involved, as travellers have different distances to the CBD as
well as strictly concave and non-separable scheduling preferences. We show that
the optimal arrival time a∗, in the absence of congestion, is increasing in distance
c, such that also here travellers sort according to their preferred arrival time.
Daganzo (2007) and Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008) show that several as-
pects of congestion in an urban area can be described as a form bottleneck con-
2Lindsey (2004) considers more general heterogeneity with a finite number of user classes.
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gestion. A space average of traffic measurements show that the trip completion
rate is a stable inverse u-shaped function of the number of vehicles present in the
system. Cars that have not yet completed their trips remain in the urban area, such
that it is possible to think of the system as a generalized sort of queue. The bottle-
neck model supposes a constant trip completion rate and a queueing system that
maintains a first-in-first-out queue. See also Geroliminis and Levinson (2009).
Section 2 presents the model setup. The analysis of equilibrium in section 3
shows that equilibrium exists uniquely in the laissez-faire situation without tolling.
Under laizzes-faire, travellers sort according to their distance to the bottleneck
such that those who are closest to the bottleneck reach the destination first. How-
ever, in general there is not a monotonous relationship between distance and de-
parture time; it is not necessarily the case that those who are located further away
will depart earlier. Section 4 then concerns equilibrium under socially optimal
tolling at the bottleneck. The toll can be taken to be zero for the first and last
travellers and strictly positive for everybody else. The optimal toll exactly re-
moves queueing. The sequence of arrivals at the destination is preserved from
the laissez-faire equilibrium.3 However, in contrast to the Vickrey analysis with
homogenous travellers, arrivals at the destination occur earlier in social optimum
than under laissez-faire. When the use of toll revenues does not affect the utility
of travellers, then the toll just represents a loss for them. This is compensated to
some extent by a gain in utility. Comparing social optimum to laissez-faire reveals
that those who are located furthest away from the bottleneck will experience a net
gain, while those who are located near the bottleneck will experience a net loss.
Section 5 illustrates the model numerically. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
deferred to the appendix.
2 A spatial model
Consider a city in which a continuum of N identical individuals are spatially dis-
tributed. They make one trip each and must all pass through a downtown bottle-
neck. The trip duration of an individual is the sum of the distance, measured in
time units, to the bottleneck and the time spent in the bottleneck.
The bottleneck has a capacity of ψ persons per time unit. The distribution
of travel distances c has cumulative distribution F with density f and support
C = [c0, c1]. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1.
3Arnott et al. (1991) consider a variant of the standard bottleneck model in which drivers have
to park, and parking spots are located at varying distances from the CBD. In the laissez-faire
user equilibrium, drivers park in order of increasing distance from CBD. The optimal location-
dependent parking fee reverses this pattern. This contrasts with the present setting where optimal
tolling does not change the order of arrivals.
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Figure 1: The representation of space
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Let a be the arrival time at the bottleneck and c be the travel distance to the
bottleneck. Then d = a− c is the departure time from home. Individuals arrive at
the bottleneck during some interval [a0, a1] at the time varying rate ρ (a) . Cumu-
lative arrivals are R (a) =
∫ a
a0
ρ (s) ds. In the case when there is queue from time
a0 to time a, then an individual who arrives at entrance of the bottleneck at time
a will arrive at the destination at time R (a) /ψ + a0, since it takes R (a) /ψ time
units for the first R (a) travelers to pass the bottleneck (Arnott et al., 1993). The
queue is vertical, meaning that its physical extension has no consequences.4
Individuals are identical with preferences concerning the timing and cost of
the trip expressed by the utility u (d, t)− τ, where d is the departure time, t > d is
the arrival time and τ is the toll payment associated with the trip.5 Toll revenues
are not returned to travellers and their utility is not affected by the use of revenues.
This assumption puts a focus on the direct impact of tolling on travellers. All other
monetary trip costs are held constant and hence ignored. In brief we shall refer to
u (d, t) as the scheduling utility. We shall define a social welfare function to be
sum of the individual utilities plus the toll revenue. Hence the welfare function
reduces to the sum of the individual scheduling utilities.
Partial derivatives of u (·, ·) are assumed to exist up to second order and are
denoted as u1, u12 etc. We assume that u (·, ·) is strictly concave and that u1 > 0 >
u2. In addition, we shall refer to the following conditions regarding the derivatives
of u.
Condition 1 ∀d ≤ t : u11 (d, t)− u1(d,t)u2(d,t)u12 (d, t) < 0.
Condition 2 ∀d ≤ t : u12 (d, t)− u1(d,t)u2(d,t)u22 (d, t) < 0.
Condition 3 ∀d ≤ t : u11 (d, t) + u12 (d, t) < 0.
Condition 4 ∀d ≤ t : u12 (d, t) + u22 (d, t) < 0.
Conditions 1 and 2 are used to prove that equilibrium is unique. Together they
ensure that u1 (a− c, a) /u2 (a− c, a) is decreasing as a function of a. Conditions
3 and 4 ensure that u1 (a− c, a) and u2 (a− c, a) are decreasing as functions of a.
We assume that u (a− c, a) attains a maximum as a function of a for any c ≥ 0.
This simply assures that travellers have an optimal time of departure when trip
4See il Mun (1999) and Arnott and DePalma (2011) for models with horizontal queues.
5A reviewer noted that scheduling preferences may be partly motivated by referring to con-
sumers who derive utility from consumption and leisure, where, e.g., leisure is produced before
departure and income for consumption is earned at work after arrival. Scheduling preferences
allow for the opportunity cost of time lost in transportation. They may also account for a benefit
from coordination of activities (Fosgerau and Small, 2011).
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duration is constant. We also assume that u1 (a− c, a) +u2 (a− c, a) ranges over
all of R as a varies.
As noted above, the key to the analysis is the formulation of scheduling util-
ity that is not additively separable in trip duration. Vickrey (1973) described a
scheduling utility that is instead additively separable in departure time and arrival
time and not linear in trip duration. Such a separable specification would have
u (d, t) = H (d) +W (t) , and the above conditions on utility would be satisfied if
H ′ > 0 > W ′, H ′′ < 0 and W ′′ < 0; cross-derivatives are zero due to the additive
separability. A possible interpretation of the Vickrey (1973) specification is that
H (d) is the utility that the traveller obtains from being at home until departure (at
time d) andW (t) is the utility the traveller obtains from being at work after arrival
(at time t). Tseng and Verhoef (2008) provide empirical evidence that supports
the Vickrey (1973) specification.
The customary α−β−γ specification is a limiting case of the Vickrey (1973)
specification in which H ′ = α, and W ′ = α − β for t < t0 and W ′ = α + γ
otherwise; the α − β − γ specification is piecewise linear and hence does not
satisfy the present conditions.
de Palma and Fosgerau (2011) use a formulation, equivalent to the current, in
which scheduling utility is taken to be a general concave and potentially nonsep-
arable function of trip duration and arrival time.
Consider a single individual facing a fixed travel time c, such as in the case
when there is no congestion. His scheduling utility as a function of the arrival
time at the bottleneck a is then u (a− c, a). Denote the optimal arrival time at
the destination by a∗ (c) = arg maxa u (a− c, a) . Then we obtain the following
result.
Theorem 1 The optimal arrival time a∗ (c) exists and is unique. Condition 3
implies that a′∗ (c) > 0. If also condition 4 holds, then a
′
∗ (c) < 1.
This theorem has significant implications. Heterogeneity in the distance to the
destination translates into heterogeneity in the optimal arrival time at the desti-
nation. That a′∗ (c) > 0 means that more distantly located individuals will pre-
fer to arrive later in the absence of queue. In particular it means that individ-
uals sort according to their distance from the destination. If a′∗ (c) < 1, then
d′(c) = a′∗ (c) − 1 < 0, which means that more distantly located individuals will
depart earlier from home. Fosgerau and Engelson (2011) presents empirical evi-
dence indicating that commuters located further from the CBD tend both to depart
earlier and to arrive later.
It is possible that the density of travellers at different distances is so low that
there will not be queueing. Therefore a condition is introduced to guarantee that
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all travellers will be queueing.6 The condition comes in three versions of different
strengths.
Condition 5 ∀c ∈ C, c > c0 : a∗ (c) < F (c)ψ + a∗ (c0) .
Condition 6 ∀c ∈ C : a′∗ (c) < f(c)ψ .
Condition 7 ∀c ∈ C : 1 < f(c)
ψ
.
Each result below refers to one of these conditions. Condition 5 ensures that if
the first traveller arrives at his optimal arrival time and if travellers sort according
to their distance to the bottleneck, then all other travellers will arrive later than
their optimal arrival time. Given sorting, the next condition 6 implies that if one
traveller hits his optimal arrival time, then all travellers located further away will
arrive later than their optimal time; thus condition 6 implies condition 5 if trav-
ellers sort. Condition 7 is the strongest version, since together with a′∗ (c) < 1 it
implies condition 6 ; condition 7 states that the density of travellers in C is every-
where greater than the bottleneck capacity. Condition 5 is weaker than condition
7 since it can be satisfied if f places more than average mass at small values of c
and less than average mass at large values of c.
3 Laissez-faire
Consider equilibrium in pure strategies, where each individual takes the behaviour
of all other individuals as given, and no individual has incentive to change his
time of arrival at the bottleneck.7 The following theorem provides some basic
characteristics of equilibrium under the laissez-faire policy of no toll.
Theorem 2 Assume that condition 5 holds. Under laissez-faire, arrivals at the
bottleneck take place during an interval [a0, a1] , where a1 = a0 + N/ψ. There is
always queue during this interval. Furthermore, a0 ≤ a∗ (c0) and a1 ≥ a∗ (c1) .
So the first traveller arrives at the bottleneck earlier than he would prefer in the
absence of congestion and the last traveller arrives later. The no residual queue
property holds, i.e., the queue is exactly gone at the time the last traveller arrives
at the bottleneck (see de Palma and Fosgerau, 2011). Otherwise the last traveller
6This condition serves to make analysis simpler, but it is not essential: analysis could be carried
out just for those travelers who do queue, the complication is that the boundary between queueing
and not queueing is affected, e.g., by tolling.
7We accept without proof that any Nash equilibrium is characterised by a differentiable func-
tion a (c) describing the time of arrival at the bottleneck for a traveller located at distance c.
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could simply postpone departure to reduce queueing while not affecting the arrival
time. The next theorem states some properties of laissez-faire equilibrium.
Theorem 3 Assume that conditions 1, 2, 3 and 5 hold. Under laissez-fare, equi-
librium exists and is unique. Individuals located at distance c from the bottleneck
arrive at the bottleneck at time a (c) , where a (c) satisfies
a′ (c) = −
u2
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
u1
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
) f (c)
ψ
> 0. (1)
The arrival schedule at the destination is
F (c)
ψ
+ a0
and the equilibrium scheduling utility is
u
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
.
The theorem first gives a differential equation for the arrival time a (c) at the
bottleneck as a function of distance. The derivative a′ is strictly positive which
means that the travellers located at greater distances arrive at the bottleneck later.
So under laissez-faire, travellers sort according to their distance to the bottleneck.
However, it is not the case that travellers located at greater distances also de-
part earlier. In general, it is not possible to sign the derivative of the departure
time d′ (c) = a′ (c)−1, since a′ (c) may be greater or smaller than 1. In particular,
if the density of distances is low in some region, then derivative of the departure
time may change sign. The numerical exercise in section 5 below exhibits such a
case where d′ (c) is positive at some distances and negative at other.
The sorting property lies behind the expression for the arrival schedule at the
destination. Travellers arrive at the bottleneck in sequence sorted according to
their distance to the bottleneck and the sequence is preserved by the bottleneck.
The first traveller, located at c0, arrives at the destination at time a0. The traveller
at c arrives at the destination when the F (c) travellers who are located closer have
arrived. They take F (c) /ψ time units to pass the bottleneck and so the traveller
at c arrives at time F (c) /ψ + a0.
Given the initial condition a (c0) = a0, (1) describes a (·) uniquely. The proof
of the theorem shows that the equilibrium condition a (c1) = a (c0) + N/ψ has a
unique solution.
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The next theorem describes the evolution of the queue. We use the termi-
nology that a unimodal function has one local maximum whereas a multimodal
function has at least two.
Theorem 4 Assume that conditions 3, 4 and 7 hold and also the conclusions of
Theorem 3. The equilibrium queue length q (c) = a0+F (c) /ψ−a (c) is unimodal
as a function of distance c.
This theorem is interesting since it shows that the evolution of the queue is
largely dissociated from the urban form; thus the distribution of distances from
residences to the CBD may be multimodal, but the queue is always unimodal.
The fundamental reason behind is that this aspect of the shape of the queue is
determined by the equilibrium condition in conjunction with the properties of
scheduling preferences. In particular, the proof of the theorem shows first that
the derivative of the queue length has the same sign as u1 + u2, and then that
u1 + u2 < 0 implies that u1 + u2 is decreasing. This guarantees that q has only
one local maximum, which hence must be global.
4 Socially optimal tolling
This section concerns the socially optimal toll, retaining the definition of equilib-
rium from the analysis of the laissez-faire equilibrium. Recall that the toll at time
a at the bottleneck is τ (a) .
Theorem 5 A socially optimal toll exists when condition 6 holds. Arrivals at
the bottleneck take place during an interval [aτ0, aτ1] according to the schedule
aτ (c) =
F (c)
ψ
+ aτ0 where aτ0 is the unique solution to
0 =
∫ aτ0+N/ψ
aτ0
(u1 (a− c, a) + u2 (a− c, a)) da.
An optimal toll satisfies
τ ′ (aτ (c)) = u1 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c)) + u2 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c)) ,
where aτ is the arrival schedule. The optimal toll satisfies τ (aτ0) = τ (aτ1) and
may be chosen such that τ (aτ0) = 0. A socially optimal toll removes exactly
the queue. The sequence of arrivals at the destination is unchanged relative to
laissez-faire. The arrival schedule at the bottleneck and at the destination is
aτ (c) =
F (c)
ψ
+ aτ0.
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In general, aτ0 6= a0, such that the arrival interval is shifted relative to laissez-
faire.
Social welfare is improved by optimal tolling, since queueing is removed. The
toll is a transfer from travellers. So it is of interest to examine whether travellers
will be better or worse off under optimal tolling, when the use of revenues does
not affect travellers. This is the concern of the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Assume conditions 3 and 6. Consider social optimum implemented
by a toll with τ (aτ0) = τ (aτ1) = 0. Then the schedule of arrivals at the destina-
tion is earlier in social optimum than under laissez-faire: aτ0 < a0. There exists
a location c with aτ (c) > a (c) .
There is an interval containing c0 such that all travellers located in this in-
terval are strictly worse off in social optimum than under laissez-faire. There is
also an interval containing c1 such that all travellers located in this interval are
strictly better off in social optimum than under laissez-faire.
Under laissez-faire, a(c0) < a∗ (c0) and a (c1) > a∗ (c1) , and there is no
queue for these travellers. The first traveller has a favourable location and can
depart quite late and still be first in the queue. The last traveller must travel a
longer distance before reaching the bottleneck and so prefers to arrive later at the
bottleneck. But because capacity is limited, he arrives even later than that. Due
to the longer distance to the bottleneck, the marginal utility of arriving earlier is
greater for the last traveller than for the first traveller . This is the mechanism
underlying the finding that the arrival interval in social optimum is earlier than
under laissez-faire.8
The existence of a location c with aτ (c) > a (c) shows that even though ar-
rivals at the bottleneck begin and end earlier in social optimum than under laissez-
faire, there are travellers who arrive later at the bottleneck in social optimum than
under laissez-faire; this is a consequence of the fact that there is no queue in the
social optimum. The observation implies a restriction on how much earlier arrivals
can shift in social optimum.
It is interesting to contrast the present model with that in Mirrlees (1972).
Maximising the same social welfare function generates inequality of equals (in
8There are other situations where optimal pricing causes the arrival interval to shift. Fosgerau
and de Palma (2011) consider a parking fee in the bottleneck model where travellers are equipped
with general scheduling preferences similar to those in this paper. The first traveller to arrive
parks longer and therefore pays more than the last traveller to arrive; this asymmetry causes the
arrival interval to shift later relative to the situation with no parking fee. Fosgerau and Small
(2011) also consider bottleneck congestion but in a situation where scheduling preferences form
endogenously. Here, depending on parameters, the arrival interval can shift in either direction as a
consequence of optimal pricing.
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terms of both preferences and endowments) in Mirrlees’ standard urban model,
whereas it reduces the inequality resulting under laissez-faire in the present setup
with unequal endowments.9
5 Numerical illustration
In this section, the theoretical model is illustrated by a numerical simulation. The
simulation assumes a continuum of individuals with mass 1. Their scheduling
preferences are given by the Vickrey (1973) type of scheduling utility
u (d, t) =
∫ d
T1
e−sds+
∫ T2
t
esds.
The constants T1 and T2 are arbitrary and are set to 0 at no consequences for
the results. The capacity rate of the bottleneck is 0.5 individuals per hour, such
that all can pass the bottleneck in two hours. The distribution of distances to
the bottleneck is bimodal, composed of two beta distributions, each with mass
1/2. One has support on [1, 1.5] and the other has support on [1.5, 2] . The density
of distances is shown in Figure 2. The distribution of distances is taken to be
bimodal, to show how such a feature carries through to the simulation results.
Recall in particular Theorem 4, which states that the queue is unimodal, regardless
of the spatial distribution of trip origins.
Given a value of the first arrival time at the bottleneck a0 = a (c0) , the simu-
lation solves the differential equation (1) numerically to find a (c). Then a search
is carried out for the value of a0 that solves a (c1) = a0 + N/ψ. The simulation
results are shown in Figure 3. The figure is discussed in detail in the following. It
shows various functions of the distance to the bottleneck. In addition to the arrival
time at the bottleneck, the figure also shows the departure time from home, and
the arrival time at the destination. The figure furthermore shows a∗, the preferred
arrival time at the destination if there was no queue, and it shows the optimum
arrival time at the destination.
It is instructive to begin by noting the preferred arrival time a∗. The specifica-
tion of symmetric scheduling utility rates β (t) = γ (−t) implies that a∗ (c) = c/2.
Consider now the laissez-faire equilibrium. The first traveller to arrive at the
bottleneck is the one located at the least distance c0. He arrives at the bottleneck at
time a0, which is earlier than a∗ (c0) and arrives at the destination at the same time
a0, since there is no queue for him. Similarly, the last traveller is the one located
at the maximum distance c1. He arrives at the bottleneck at time a1 > a∗ (c1) and
the queue is exactly gone at this time.
9We thank a reviewer for contributing this observation.
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Figure 2: The density of distances to the bottleneck
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Figure 3: Departure and arrival times
Figure 4 shows the length of the queue as a function of the location of the
travellers. This is not a concave function but it is unimodal as shown in Theorem
4.
Returning to Figure 3, consider next the departure time function. This is evi-
dently not a monotone function. In this simulation, the traveller at distance 1.54
departs as the first at time about -1.2. Travellers located closer depart slightly
later. This confirms the general finding that more distant travellers will not always
depart earlier. For travellers located further away there is almost a monotonous
relationship whereby more distant travellers depart later.
Consider now the social optimum. The arrival time at the destination has the
same functional form as the laissez-faire arrival time at the destination F (c) /ψ+
aτ0, where aτ0 is a constant. This happens because the bottleneck capacity is fixed
and the sequence of arrivals at the bottleneck is unchanged in optimum relative to
laissez-faire. In the simulation, aτ0 is found numerically to maximize average
scheduling utility. The gray curve on Figure 3 shows the optimum arrival time at
the bottleneck as a function of distance. It is also the arrival time at the destination,
since there is no queue in optimum. The simulation confirms the result from
Theorem 6 that the optimum arrival time is earlier than the laissez-faire arrival
time. In this case, the first traveller departs about 0.12 hours earlier in optimum
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Figure 4: Length of the queue
than in laissez-faire. This means that the traveller at c0 is worse off in equilibrium
since he already arrives before his preferred arrival time. Conversely, the traveller
at c1 is better off.
Figure 5 shows the utilities achieved by individuals at different locations. The
fat line shows the indirect utility of individuals under laissez-faire, consisting of
scheduling utility only. It is decreasing in the distance to the bottleneck. The
upper thin line shows the scheduling utility in social optimum. The difference
between that and the laissez-faire utility, weighted by the density of individuals at
different locations, is the welfare gain from tolling. The lower thin line shows the
indirect utility in social optimum, equal to the scheduling utility minus the toll. So
the toll is visible as the difference between the two thin lines. The indirect utility
in social optimum is decreasing but less steeply than under laissez-faire, such that
difference ranges from negative to positive.
It is clearly visible how travellers located near the bottleneck lose in social
optimum while those far away gain. The indirect utility difference between the
individual nearest and furthest from the bottleneck is reduced from 2.9 under
laissez-faire to 2.1 in social optimum.
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Figure 5: Utilities achieved at different locations
6 Conclusion
This paper has introduced spatial heterogeneity into the bottleneck model such
that it can be used to represent a city with a central bottleneck. A number of
new insights are generated from the model. Perhaps the most important insight is
that travellers located near the bottleneck will tend to lose from optimal tolling,
while those located far away will tend to gain, when the use of toll revenues is not
accounted for. The paper also shows that a reason for the congested demand peaks
to be uni-modal can be found in the properties of equilibrium in combination with
our general specification of scheduling preferences.
A relevant question, raised by a reviewer, is whether equal redistribution of
the toll revenue would make the social optimum a Pareto improvement relative to
laissez-faire. This would be a significant finding, indicating that more elaborate
mechanisms for revenue recycling might not be needed to gain acceptability of
pricing.
The crucial property that generates sorting both under laissez-faire and in the
social optimum is that the schedule of arrivals at the bottleneck changes with
derivative having the same sign as−(u11 +u12). Condition 3 then ensures that the
derivative is strictly positive. Strict concavity of scheduling utility requires that
16
u11 + 2u12 + u22 < 0, but it is still possible to formulate scheduling utility with
u11 +u12 > 0 for some values of d, t. Future work could investigate the properties
of equilibria under such scheduling utility. The illustrative case of α − β − γ
scheduling utility discussed in the Introduction does not fit into this framework as
it is piecewise linear and hence not strictly concave.
The spatial distribution of travellers is a source of heterogeneity in the model.
It would be of interest to introduce other sources of heterogeneity into the model.
One issue would be the robustness of the sorting property. Another kind of exten-
sion would be to introduce risk into the model, for example in the form of random
capacity (Arnott et al., 1999) or random queue sorting (de Palma and Fosgerau,
2011).
Perhaps the most interesting extension would be to make the location of indi-
viduals endogenous as in the Mirrlees (1972) standard urban model. This would
tie together congestion dynamics and urban economic models. For example Arnott
(1998) combines a model of urban spatial structure with the α− β− γ bottleneck
model; optimal tolling does not change transport costs for travellers so when the
revenues are not returned, optimal tolling will have no effect on urban structure.
As Arnott (1998) notes, this is in contrast to urban economic models with static
congestion. However, the Arnott (1998) result is a consequence of space essen-
tially being assumed away in the specification of preferences as was discussed in
the Introduction to this paper.
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A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The optimal arrival time a∗ (c) exists uniquely by the
assumptions on u. Note that the first order condition for utility maximization is
that
u1 (a∗ (c)− c, a∗ (c)) + u2 (a∗ (c)− c, a∗ (c)) = 0
and that differentiating the first order condition with respect to c shows that
a′∗ (c) =
u11 + u12
u11 + 2u12 + u22
. (2)
Then condition 3 implies that a′∗ (c) > 0.If also condition 4 holds, then a
′
∗ (c) < 1.
Lemma 1 If a0 ≤ a∗ (c0) , a0 + N/ψ = a1 ≥ a∗ (c1) , and if there is no queue
at time a1, then, taking the behavior of all other travellers as given, any traveller
will choose arrival time at the bottleneck in the interval [a0, a1] .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary traveller located at c. Then a0 ≤ a∗ (c0) ≤ a∗ (c) ≤
a∗ (c1) ≤ a1. Therefore the traveller prefers to arrive at the bottleneck at time a0 to
any time before, since there is no queue at time a0. Similarly, he prefers arriving
at the bottleneck at time a1 to any time after, since the queue is gone at time a1.
Therefore he will choose to arrive at the bottleneck during [a0, a1] .
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A.1 Equilibrium
Lemma 2 The arrival rate given by (1) and∫ c1
c0
a′ (c) dc = N/ψ (3)
satisfies a (c0) ≤ a∗ (c0) and a (c1) ≥ a∗ (c1) when (5) holds.
Proof. Note first that a (c) > a∗ (c) implies that a′ (c) > f (c) /ψ. So it is not
possible to have a (c) > a∗ (c) for all c, since then a1 − a0 > N/ψ contradicting
(3).
Assume now that a0 > a∗ (c0) . Let c′ be the first c with a (c) = a∗ (c) . Then
a (c′) > a0 + F (c) /ψ > a∗ (c0) + F (c) /ψ > a∗ (c′) , which is a contradiction.
Hence a (c0) ≤ a∗ (c0) follows.
Assume now that a1 < a∗ (c1) . If a0 +F (c) /ψ < a∗ (c) for all c then a′ (c) <
f (c) /ψ for all c, which is a contradiction with (3). So there is a last c′′ with
a0 + F (c
′′) /ψ = a∗ (c′′) . Now N/ψ − F (c′′) /ψ = a1 − a∗ (c′′) < a∗ (c1) −
a∗ (c′′) < N/ψ − F (c′′) /ψ, by (5). This is a contradiction and hence a (c1) ≥
a∗ (c1) follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. Note first that a∗ (c) is strictly increasing in c such that
a∗ (c0) < a∗ (c1) . Consider laissez-faire equilibrium and let [a0, a1] be the small-
est interval containing all arrivals at the bottleneck. Then a0 ≤ a∗ (c) for all c,
since otherwise it would be possible for some to postpone arrival at the queue
without meeting congestion and increase utility. Hence a0 ≤ a∗ (c0) . The argu-
ment for a1 ≥ a∗ (c1) is similar. If a1−a0 > N/ψ, then there will exist an interval
where the bottleneck capacity is not fully utilized and where it will be possible for
some to relocate to increase utility, since a∗ (c1) − a∗ (c0) < N/ψ by Condition
5. This would contradict equilibrium. If a1 − a0 < N/ψ, then there is a residual
queue at time a1 and the last individual to arrive could postpone departure from
the destination without delaying arrival. This would lead to a strict increase in
utility which would contradict equilibrium. Hence a1 = a0 +N/ψ.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume first that equilibrium exists. By Theorem 2, there
is always queue during [a0, a1] , such that R (a) ≥ ψ (a− a0) . The first order
condition for utility maximization for an individual located at distance c is
0 = u1
(
a− c, R (a)
ψ
+ a0
)
+ u2
(
a− c, R (a)
ψ
+ a0
)
ρ (a)
ψ
(4)
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and the corresponding second order condition is (suppressing some notation)
0 > u11 + 2u12
ρ
ψ
+ u22
(
ρ
ψ
)2
+ u2
ρ′
ψ
. (5)
Denote the solution by a (c) . Achieved utility u
(
a (c)− c, R(a(c))
ψ
+ a0
)
for an
individual at c satisfies
∂
∂c
u
(
a (c)− c, R (a (c))
ψ
+ a0
)
= u1 · (a′ − 1) + u2 ρ
ψ
a′
= −u1 < 0
by the first order condition (4). Then utility is decreasing in the distance from the
bottleneck.
Differentiate the first order condition (4) with respect to c to find that
0 = u11 · (a′ − 1) + u12 · ρ
ψ
(2a′ − 1) + u22 · ρ
2
ψ2
· a′ + u2 · ρ
ψ
a′
=
∂2u
∂a2
· a′ (c)− (u11 + u12) .
By Condition 3, a′ (c) > 0. Then a (·) has an inverse c (·) with a (c (a)) = a and
c′ (a) = 1/a′ (c (a)) > 0. In this case, R (a) = F (c (a)) , such that
ρ (a) =
f (c (a))
a′ (c (a))
. (6)
The first order condition (4) then shows that
a′ (c) =
f (c)
ρ (a (c))
= −
u2
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
u1
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
) f (c)
ψ
,
such that a (·) > 0 is determined from a (c0) = a0 by a (c) = a0 +
∫ c
c0
a′ (ζ) dζ .
Equilibrium requires that a (c1) = a0 + N/ψ. This defines a0 uniquely as the
following argument shows. Note first that
∂a′ (c)
∂a0
=
[
u2
u21
(
u11
∂a (c)
∂a0
+ u12
)
− u12
∂a(c)
∂a0
+ u22
u1
]
f (c)
ψ
=
u2
u21
[(
u11 − u1
u2
u12
)(
∂ (a (c)− a0)
∂a0
+ 1
)
+
(
u12 − u1
u2
u22
)]
f (c)
ψ
.
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This is strictly positive by conditions 1 and 2 if ∂(a(c)−a0)
∂a0
≥ 0. Note next that
∂ (a (c)− a0)
∂a0
=
∫ c
c0
∂a′ (c)
∂a0
dc.
Then ∂(a(c)−a0)
∂a0
> 0 if ∂(a(ζ)−a0)
∂a0
≥ 0 for all ζ < c. Also, ∂(a(c0)−a0)
∂a0
= 0 and
∂a′(c0)
∂a0
> 0 such that ∂(a(c)−a0)
∂a0
≥ 0 for c in a small neighborhood around c0.
Therefore ∂(a(c)−a0)
∂a0
> 0 for all c > c0. In particular,
∂(a(c1)−a0)
∂a0
> 0. Since
equilibrium requires that a (c1)− a0 = N/ψ, there can only be one equilibrium.
It remains to show that equilibrium exists, i.e. that there exists a0 such that
a (c1) − a0 = N/ψ. It is sufficient to show that there are values of a0 such
that
∫ c1
c0
a′ (c) dc can attain values both larger and smaller than N/ψ. Consider
therefore first a0 +N/ψ < a∗ (c0) . Then by conditions 1 and 2, if for some c
a (c) ≤ F (c)
ψ
+ a0 (7)
then also
a′ (c) = −
u2
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
u1
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
) < 1.
But (7) holds near c0 and therefore both inequalities hold for all c. Then∫ c1
c0
a′ (c) dc <
∫ c1
c0
f (c)
ψ
dc =
N
ψ
.
The opposite inequality can be obtained for a0 > a∗ (c1) . This establishes exis-
tence of equilibrium.
We have shown that (1) together with (3) has a unique solution. This does
not depend on the existence of equilibrium. Using the above arguments, it is then
easy to see that no individual can improve his arrival time at the bottleneck within
[a0, a1] . It remains to be shown that a (c0) ≤ a∗ (c0) and a (c1) ≥ a∗ (c1) . But this
is shown in Appendix Lemma 2. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the proposed solution
does indeed define an equilibrium, which then exists uniquely.
Proof of Theorem 4. Using 1, the derivative of the equilibrium queue length is
found to be
q′ (c) =
f (c)
ψ
u1
(
a (c)− c, a0 + F (c)ψ
)
+ u2
(
a (c)− c, a0 + F (c)ψ
)
u1
(
a (c)− c, a0 + F (c)ψ
) .
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Notation for the point where u is evaluated is suppressed in the remainder of
the proof. The derivative q′ has the same sign as u1 + u2. We shall show that
u1 + u2 < 0 implies that u1 + u2 is decreasing. This is sufficient to guarantee that
q is quasiconcave. So compute
∂ (u1 + u2)
∂c
= (u11 + u12) (a
′ − 1) + (u12 + u22) f
ψ
= − (u11 + u12)
(
u2
u1
f
ψ
+ 1
)
+ (u12 + u22)
f
ψ
< − (u11 + u12) u1 + u2
u1
+ (u12 + u22)
where the second equality follows from (1) and the inequality follows from the
assumptions of the Theorem. Then by Conditions 3 and 4, u1 + u2 < 0 =⇒
∂(u1+u2)
∂c
< 0.
A.2 Optimal tolling
Proof of Theorem 5. In optimum, arrivals at the bottleneck take place during
an interval of length N/ψ. If there is queue at some point, then arrivals can be
delayed such that welfare is improved and the queue is reduced. Hence there is no
queue in social optimum and Rτ (a) = ψ (a− aτ0) , ρτ (a) = ψ. Denote by aτ (·)
the optimal arrival time at the bottleneck under optimal tolling for an individual
located at c. The first order condition for utility maximization is
τ ′ (aτ (c)) = u1 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c)) + u2 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c))
and the second order condition is
τ ′′ (aτ (c)) > u11 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c))+2u12 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c))+u22 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c)) .
Differentiate the first order condition with respect to c to find that
u11 · (a′τ − 1) + u12 · (2a′τ − 1) + u22a′τ − τ ′′ · a′τ = 0, (8)
which implies that a′τ > 0 by the second order condition and condition 3. Then
Rτ (aτ (c)) = F (c) = ψ (aτ (c)− aτ0) , such that aτ (c) = F (c)ψ + aτ0, and the
inverse of aτ is cτ (a) = F−1 (ψ (a− aτ0)) . So now from the first order condition,
τ ′ (a) = u1
(
a− F−1 (ψ (a− aτ0)) , a
)
+ u2
(
a− F−1 (ψ (a− aτ0)) , a
)
, (9)
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such that
τ (a)− τ (aτ0) =
∫ a
aτ0
τ ′ (s) ds
=
∫ a
aτ0
(
u1
(
s− F−1 (ψ (s− aτ0)) , s
)
+ u2
(
s− F−1 (ψ (s− aτ0)) , s
))
ds.
Any such toll ensures that individuals located at c will prefer to arrive at the bot-
tleneck at time aτ (c) to any other time during [aτ0, aτ1] .
The average scheduling utility under tolling is
Eu =
∫ c1
c0
u
(
F (c)
ψ
+ aτ0 − c, F (c)
ψ
+ aτ0
)
f (c) dc.
Differentiate with respect to a0 to find that (writing u1 for u1
(
F (c)
ψ
+ a0 − c, F (c)ψ + a0
)
etc.)
∂Eu
∂a0
=
∫ c1
c0
(u1 + u2) f (c) dc
∂2Eu
∂ (a0)
2 =
∫ c1
c0
(u11 + 2u12 + u22) f (c) dc < 0.
So Eu is concave as a function of a0; ∂Eu∂a0 is positive for some a0 sufficiently
smaller than 0 and negative for some a0 sufficiently larger than 0. This follows
from the assumption that u1 + u2 varies over all of R. Then Eu attains a global
maximum. Make the change of variable a = F (c)
ψ
+ aτ0 in the equation ∂Eu∂a0 =
0 to find that the optimal location of the interval of arrival at the bottleneck is
determined by
0 =
∫ aτ0+N/ψ
aτ0
(u1 (a− c, a) + u2 (a− c, a)) da.
Then by (9), τ (aτ0) = τ (aτ1) .
There remains the possibility that individuals may prefer a time outside this
interval. By Lemma 1, this will not happen if the toll is such that τ (aτ0) =
τ (aτ1) = 0 and aτ0 ≤ a∗ (c0) , a∗ (c1) ≤ aτ1.
To verify that aτ0 ≤ a∗ (c0) , a∗ (c1) ≤ aτ1, note that a (c) Q a∗ (c) ⇐⇒
τ ′ (a) R 0. The toll is not constant, so there must be a point c′ where a (c′) =
a∗ (c′) . There can only be one such point by (6). The desired conclusion follows.
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Proof of Theorem 6. For a person located at c ∈ C, examine the difference in
utility between the cases with and without optimal tolling.
∆u (c) = u (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c))− τ (aτ (c))− u
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
.
Differentiate this expression with respect to c and insert from first order conditions
to find that
∂∆u (c)
∂c
= u1
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
− u1 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c)) .
Therefore the utility difference can be expressed as
∆u (c) = ∆u (c0)+
∫ c
c0
[
u1
(
a (ζ)− ζ, F (ζ)
ψ
+ a0
)
− u1 (aτ (ζ)− ζ, aτ (ζ))
]
dζ.
Note now that a0 + F (c0) /ψ < a∗ (c0) and a0 + F (c1) /ψ > a∗ (c1) and that the
curves a0 + F (c) /ψ and a∗ (c) intersect in the interior of C. Similarly, aτ (c0) <
a∗ (c0) and aτ (c1) > a∗ (c1) and the curves aτ (c) = aτ0 + F (c) /ψ and a∗ (c)
intersect in the interior of C. Thus, ∆u (c0) ·∆u (c1) < 0, i.e. one of the endpoint
differences must be positive and the other must be negative. Which is positive
depends on the sign of aτ0 − a0.
It must be the case that aτ0 < a0 : Otherwise aτ (c) ≥ a0 + F (c) /ψ ≥ a (c)
for all c, which implies that ∆u (c0) ≥ 0, ∂∆u(c)∂c < 0 for interior c by condition 3
and ∆u (c1) ≤ 0, which is a contradiction.
Since there is no queue for commuters located at c0 and c1, we have ∆u (c0) <
0 < ∆u (c1) . There exists a c with aτ (c) > a (c): Otherwise the curves a (·) and
aτ (·) do not intersect, which implies that
u1 (aτ (c)− c, aτ (c)) > u1
(
F (c)
ψ
+ a0 − c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
> u1
(
a (c)− c, F (c)
ψ
+ a0
)
for all c. Then ∂∆u(c)
∂c
< 0, which is a contradiction.
The same argument shows that ∂∆u(c)
∂c
|c=c0 < 0 and ∂∆u(c)∂c |c=c1 < 0.
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